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LAW, POLITICS, AND COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Daniel H. Cole*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the significant role cost–benefit analysis (CBA)
plays in facilitating or impeding legislative and regulatory policy
decisions. The Article centers around three case studies of CBAs the EPA
prepared under three different presidents: (1) Clinton Administration
changes to Clean Air Act air quality standards for ozone and particulate
matter; (2) President Obama’s recent decision to suspend the EPA’s
reconsideration of the Bush Administration’s air quality standard for
ozone; and (3) the George W. Bush Administration’s “Clear Skies”
legislative initiative. The first two case studies demonstrate, between them,
how well-constructed CBAs can facilitate social-welfare-enhancing and
impede welfare-reducing rules, even in cases where explicit consideration
of costs is legally prohibited. The third case study tells a more complex
story of how CBAs can be manipulated either to promote welfare-reducing
regulations or impede welfare-enhancing regulations. When that happens,
however, the virtuous transparency of CBAs renders those efforts liable to
discovery and disclosure, as in the case of the Bush Administration’s failed
“Clear Skies” initiative. The Article concludes with an assessment of the
implications of the case studies for our understanding of the role of CBA in
political (both legislative and regulatory) processes, and with a call for
more qualitative and quantitative empirical research on the use and abuse
of CBA as a political tool.
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INTRODUCTION
Governments at all levels have a legitimate, sometimes critical, role to
play in resolving social-cost problems, including prevention of negative
externalities, such as pollution and provision of public goods. Over time,
governments and their agencies have developed various decision tools to
assist those efforts. Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is one such tool and is
often incorporated into larger documents known as regulatory impact
analyses (RIAs).
Formal CBA has been around since the New Deal when President
Roosevelt’s National Planning Board (established in 1934) began
commissioning economic analyses of public works projects.1 Congress first
required CBA in the Flood Control Act of 1936,2 § 1 of which provided
that, “the Federal Government should improve or participate in the
improvement of navigable waters . . . for flood-control purposes if the
benefits . . . are in excess of the estimated costs . . . .”3 At that time,
however, “the whole area of costs and benefits from flood control projects
was poorly understood,”4 and no uniform set of principles and standards
existed for measuring costs and benefits of government policies.5 In the
1940s and 1950s, despite significant efforts to impose a uniform set of best
practices for CBAs of water resources projects,6 individual agencies,
1.
Maynard M. Hufschmidt, Benefit–Cost Analysis: 1933–1985, 116 WATER RES. UPDATE 42, 42
(2000).
2.
Id.
3.
Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570, 1570 (1936).
4.
JOSEPH L. ARNOLD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE 1936 FLOOD CONTROL ACT 81 (1988).
5.
Hufschmidt, supra note 1, at 42.
6.
In May 1950, the Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee—predecessor of the InterAgency Committee on Water Resources (ICWR)—proposed the first set of federal “best practice”
standards for CBA, with specific application to river basin projects. FED. INTER-AGENCY RIVER BASIN
COMM., SUBCOMM. ON BENEFITS & COSTS, PROPOSED PRACTICES FOR ECON. ANALYSIS OF RIVER
BASIN PROJECTS (1950). But the “Green Book,” as the document came to be known, was never
formally adopted by participating agencies. Hufschmidt, supra note 1, at 43. The ICWR’s effort was
closely followed, however, by the President’s Bureau of the Budget—predecessor of today’s Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)—which prepared its own set of CBA standards and practices,
culminating in the 1952 publication of Budget Circular A-47. The Bureau’s document was more
“conservative” than the 1950 “Green Book” in restricting the use of secondary benefits, requiring the
use of the opportunity-cost approach to discounting future streams of costs and benefits, tied to the
interest rate on long-term government bonds, and restricting to fifty years the time horizon for
incorporating costs and benefits. Critics, including water resource agencies and proponents of water
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including the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers,
continued to take their own, often inconsistent, approaches to CBA.7 Only
later, in the 1970s, did the use of CBA expand beyond water resources
policy to encompass broader government programs, including pollution
control.8 Since then, the discipline has continued to develop and mature.9
In theory, CBA is supposed to be a neutral decision tool that helps
government decision makers focus resources to maximize the social returns
of public investments (or publicly mandated private investments) by (a)
choosing social-cost problems worth resolving and (b) selecting
mechanisms to resolve them.10 It is viewed as a kind of filter designed to
capture welfare-reducing proposals, while allowing welfare-enhancing
proposals to pass through.11
In reality, CBA inevitably requires value judgments that are inherently
subjective, rendering the analyses potentially manipulable for political
ends. The most important subjective elements of CBAs include (a)
valuations of reductions in human mortality12 and other non-market (e.g.,
environmental) goods and (b) the values used to determine the social
discount rate.13 In the literature, one finds a large range of acceptable
values for discount rates and non-market goods, including human lives,
large enough to permit the strategic manipulation of outcomes that would
either support or oppose efforts to resolve large-scale, social-cost

resource projects in Congress, widely regarded Circular A-47 as a “severe restraint on water projects.”
Id. Perhaps to counter that effect, the ICWR issued a new version of its “Green Book” in 1958. INTERAGENCY COMM. ON WATER RES., SUBCOMM. ON EVALUATION STANDARDS, PROPOSED PRACTICES FOR
ECON. ANALYSIS OF RIVER BASIN PROJECTS (1958). This new edition of the “Green Book” did not
differ greatly from the 1950 edition. Compared to Circular A-47, the 1958 “Green Book” supported
longer time horizons, lower discount rates, and more extensive incorporation of secondary benefits,
which served to justify more government action. Hufschmidt, supra note 1, at 44. Between Circular A47 and the 1958 “Green Book,” we see the beginnings of politically-motivated wrangling over CBA
methodology, which continues to the present.
7.
Hufschmidt, supra note 1, at 43; see also Daniel H. Cole, Best Practice in Benefit–Cost
Analysis, 23 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 4 (2007) (noting that, “before the 1970s government agencies only
rarely attempted to quantify the costs and benefits of their burgeoning regulatory programs, let alone
predict costs and benefits prior to policy implementation”).
8.
Hufschmidt, supra note 1, at 43−44.
9.
Id.
10.
Cole, supra note 7, at 5. In practice, CBAs usually come into play only after a course of action
already has been proposed. However, because non-action is always a policy option, every CBA
inevitably involves an implicit or explicit determination of whether (de)regulatory action is warranted in
the first place.
11.
Id.
12.
Often, cost–benefit analysts are accused of placing economic values on human lives. That is
not quite accurate, although human life valuations can plausibly be derived from cost-estimates of
measures designed to reduce mortality. See generally Trudy Ann Cameron, Euthanizing the Value of a
Statistical Life, 4 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 161 (2010).
13.
Cole, supra note 7, at 3.
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problems.14 Thus, CBAs are useful for both policy proponents and
opponents.
Sometimes, competing CBAs even become focal points for substantive
policy disputes, as in the case of climate change, where economists have
split into two camps based on whether their cost–benefit models focus on
the mean expected damages of climate change or incorporate lowprobability, high-magnitude climate “catastrophes.”15 Those who focus on
mean expected damages generally prefer a gradual ramping-up of
greenhouse gas regulations.16 Others, who incorporate more high-harm
scenarios into their climate models, generally prefer more rapid and
stringent regulations.17
The main purpose of this Article is not to assess whether CBAs more
often impede or promote solutions to social-cost problems, but simply to
describe and assess their influence in the context of specific cases and to
explain how and why they are politically useful tools for interest groups
and agencies even when those agencies are not required by law to prepare
CBAs. For better or worse, CBAs have influenced policies for dealing with,
or not dealing with, social-cost problems ranging from airport enlargement
to water pollution standards and global climate change.18
Part I of this Article describes, in relatively simple terms, the process of
CBA. Part II consists of three case studies that examine the legitimate uses,
as well as abuses, of CBAs by federal government agencies to either
promote or impede regulatory policies. Those cases entail several important
implications, including: (1) CBAs nearly always influence and can
determine political outcomes, even when they are not supposed to do so
under existing legal rules; (2) federal agencies, even when legally barred
from considering cost, have incentives to produce and sometimes
strategically manipulate CBAs to preempt or undermine political
opposition to regulatory or deregulatory proposals; (3) because the
assumptions of formal CBAs—including, for example, the valuation of
14.
See, e.g., Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant, Introduction to DISCOUNTING AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 1, 4 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999).
15.
See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Macro-Risks: The Challenge for
Rational Risk Regulation, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 401, 412–13 (2000); Hal R. Varian,
Recalculating the Costs of Global Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at C3. See generally
David Weisbach & Cass. R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 433 (2009).
16.
See e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, Climate Change: The Uncertainties, the Certainties, and What
They Imply About Action, 4 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, no. 3, June 2007 at art. 3, 4, available at
http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/EEP131/fall2007/ClimateChange/Climate%20Change%20The%20Unce
rtainties...%20(Schelling).pdf.
17.
See NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007).
18.
See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING (2000); Robert Haveman, The Chicago O’Hare Expansion: A Case
Study of Administrative Manipulation of Benefit–Cost Principles, 23 RES. L. & ECON. 183 (2007).
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non-market goods such as human mortality and the social discount rate—
are generally required to be transparent, manipulation of CBAs for political
ends is not always a successful strategy.
I. THE CBA PROCESS: OBJECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF SUBJECTIVE
CHOICE
At its simplest, CBA can be described as a six-step process:19
(1) specify the social-cost problem to be resolved—sometimes, but
not always, exogenous to the CBA;
(2) identify policy alternatives for doing so, including no action;
(3) determine foreseeable impacts, including non-market impacts,
of each of the alternatives over their expected life-spans as against
some baseline;
(4) assign values to those impacts:
(a) favorable impacts = benefits,
(b) unfavorable impacts = costs;
(5) discount future costs and benefits to present-day dollars and
calculate the net present benefits or costs for each alternative;
(6) finally, compare the net benefits/costs or all alternatives and
choose the alternative with the greatest net benefits or lowest net
costs.
The process appears straightforward enough, but appearances are
deceiving. At virtually every step, subjective judgment calls are required,20
which can bias the CBA either for or against proposed policies. In Step 1,
the selection of the goal, or even the way the goal is framed, can influence
the measurement of success or failure.21 Step 2, which involves the
identification of policy alternatives, inevitably requires more or less
arbitrary line-drawing, as the number of conceivable alternatives inevitably

19.
See generally Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost–Benefit Analysis, 109
YALE L.J. 165, 177−88 (1999).
20.
This assertion is not novel or even very controversial. See, e.g., E.J. MISHAN, COST–BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION 175–80, 322–24 (1971); ARTHUR SMITHIES, THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
IN THE UNITED STATES 344–45 (1955); Martin S. Feldstein, The Social Time Preference Discount Rate
in Cost Benefit Analysis, 74 ECON. J. 360, 362 (1964); Christopher Nash, David Pearce & John Stanley,
An Evaluation of Cost–Benefit Analysis Criteria, 22 SCOTT. J. POL. ECON. 121, 122 (1975); A.R. Priest
& R. Turvey, Cost–Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 ECON. J. 683, 685 (1965).
21.
As observed in discussion supra note 10, policy goals typically are decided upon prior to the
preparation of CBAs. However, because CBAs judge welfare effects against a business-as-usual/noaction baseline, they can and do affect the threshold decision to act as well as the choice of mechanism
for action. Cole, supra note 7, at 10. Thus, goal setting is not completely exogenous to the CBA
process. Even if it were, goal setting inevitably would involve its own CBA, however (in)formal. Cole,
supra note 7, at 10.
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outstrips the capacity of any single CBA or broader decision-making
process.22 Likewise, as every first-year law student learns in Torts class, the
determination of foreseeable impacts requires the drawing of lines that
cannot legitimately be tied to neutral principles or presumed consensus
among all potentially interested parties.23
Steps 4 and 5 in the CBA process provide more obvious and oftdebated problems. In Step 4, values must be assigned to non-market goods,
such as human lives, scenic vistas, and endangered plant species, without
the usually reliable measure of money—this is sometimes referred to as a
problem of “missing markets.”24 Despite unarguable improvements in
alternative valuation techniques, including contingent valuation, hedonic
pricing, travel-cost methods, etc., the range of “acceptable” valuations (as
defined by editors and peer reviewers at academic journals) remains large,
and the choice of any valuation within the “acceptable” range is
contestable.25 Not only do analysts disagree about the values, they cannot
even agree about the best way of measuring the values.26 In valuing various
risks of death, is it best to measure statistical lives saved or lost, life years
saved or lost, or quality-adjusted life years saved or lost? Are the lives of
older statistical persons worth more or less than the lives of younger
statistical persons? Are lives in some locales worth more than lives in
others? If so, should valuations depend on per capita gross domestic
product, wage levels, or living standards of the relevant country, county, or
city?27 The fact that these issues persist should not be taken to mean that
valuations of threats to human lives (among other non-market goods) are
subject to such profound uncertainty as to disable CBA from eliciting
useful information for policy decisions. However, no single CBA can be
22.
Cole, supra note 7, at 25–26.
23.
The classic case illustrating this point is Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99,
100–01 (N.Y. 1928). See also H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 232 (1959)
(observing that “in one sense everything is foreseeable, in another sense nothing”); DAVID G. OWEN ET
AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14:4 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that “the innate
vagueness of ‘foreseeability’” renders it a poor metric for determining the scope of liability).
24.
See generally Cole, supra note 7, at 25–26.
25.
Bounding the “acceptable” range seems more a matter of convention than an objective
determination that higher and lower valuations cannot be correct. Portney & Weyant, supra note 14.
26.
Id.
27.
OMB Circular A-4 includes a useful discussion of different approaches to valuing human lives.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-4, at 31–37 (Sept.
17, 2003), www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf [hereinafter
OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-4]. On the various issues raised by efforts to value human life, see, e.g.,
RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST–BENEFIT
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 77–81 (2008); David A. Dana,
Valuing Foreign Lives and Settlements, 1 J. BENEFIT–COST ANALYSIS, no. 1, Jan. 2010, at art. 3; James
K. Hammit, Valuing Changes in Mortality Risk: Lives Saved Versus Life Years Saved, 1 REV. ENVTL.
ECON. & POL’Y 228 (2007); Ted R. Miller, Variations Between Countries in Values of Statistical Life,
34 J. TRANSPORT ECON. POL’Y169 (2000); Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted
Value of Life, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 269 (1988).
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objectively correct because the business of valuing non-market goods is
inherently subjective and contestable.28
Aside from valuing death prevention, how do we measure morbidity
effects that reduce the quality of life but do not kill? What, for example, is
the value of a single asthma attack averted or a significantly reduced risk of
a non-fatal cancer from a particular source? Beyond human life and health,
how do we value ecosystem effects—for example, all of the seabirds, sea
mammals, and other wildlife killed in the Exxon Valdez oil spill of 1989?29
Surely no one could claim with a straight face that answers to these
questions are objectively discernible in a politically neutral way.30 Values
must be assigned, however, because otherwise those goods would receive a
default value of zero in CBAs,31 which is usually, though not inevitably,32
worse than assigning an erroneous positive value.33
Once more or less arbitrary values are assigned to non-market goods
and bads (along with the market values of goods and bads that are regularly
28.
Former Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) chief John Graham argues that
valuation problems have been reduced in recent years by improvements in CBA methodology. John D.
Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 483–516
(2008). But absent the metric of money (valuations obtained from actual market exchanges), the
valuation of non-market goods, such as human lives and human health, must remain substantially
uncertain and, therefore contestable. See, e.g., Judson Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, On the Value of
Formal Assessment of Uncertainty in Regulatory Analysis, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 154, 154 (2007).
CBAs can deal with uncertainty, but only imperfectly, e.g., by running “Monte Carlo” simulations that
generate a probability distribution of outcomes (or values).
29.
See DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 318
(2005).
30.
As in most other cases involving harm to non-market goods such as wildlife, analysts used
contingent valuation (CV) techniques in the Exxon Valdez case to determine the extent of damages.
Some economists believe that CV surveys provide no useful insights as to value. See, e.g., Peter A.
Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 45, 62 (1994). Others defend the technique as consistent with economic theory and
necessary to evaluate non-market goods. See, e.g., W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment
Through Contingent Valuation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 37–38 (1994). A CV study of the Exxon Valdez
disaster concluded that the damage to passive use values alone amounted to $2.8 billion. RICHARD T.
CARSON ET AL., A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY OF LOST PASSIVE USE VALUES RESULTING FROM
THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL, A REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 111 (1992), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6984/. By contrast, the jury in the litigation that
inevitably followed the oil spill held Exxon responsible for just $287 million in compensatory damages.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 480–81 (2008). Even assuming no bias on the part of
either the jury or the economists who undertook the contingent valuation study, no objective basis exists
for concluding that one valuation was correct or even more accurate than the other.
31.
This stark fact places the onus on critics of CV, such as Diamond and Hausman, supra note 30,
to offer a preferable substitute. As a practical matter, non-market environmental goods are still
frequently assigned a value of zero because many agency CBAs, including those of the Environmental
Protection Agency, exclude the more difficult to evaluate environmental benefits (as opposed to publichealth benefits) of regulatory proposals.
32.
Overestimating values can be just as big a problem as underestimating them. For example, if
the benefit of some good is $10, assigning it a value of $0 in a CBA would distort the analysis less than
assigning it a value of $21.
33.
The problem is compounded in a Monte Carlo framework because the assumption of a zero
value implies that the standard error is also zero. I am grateful to Dave Weimer for this observation.

COLE 55 – 89 (DO NOT DELETE)

62

10/19/2012 11:26 AM

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 64:1:55

traded), any benefits or costs arising after the initial date of policy
implementation must be discounted at some rate, including potentially a
zero rate, to derive their net present value, which is their value at the time
of policy adoption. The need for discounting is intuitive from the
perspective of the opportunity cost of investment. Because a dollar today
can be invested at some positive rate of interest, it is worth more than a
dollar tomorrow, next year, or in ten years’ time. An alternative but equally
prominent approach to discounting, based on the marginal rate of time
preference rather than the opportunity cost of investment, stems from the
works of Irving Fisher and Frank Ramsey.34
The marginal rate of time preference approach to discounting differs
from the opportunity cost of investment approach mainly in that the former
focuses on deferring (or not) one’s own consumption of some good, while
the latter focuses not on personal consumption but on maximizing market
returns from investments.35 In the idealized micro-economy of neoclassical
theory, the two approaches would lead to identical social discount rates.36
But because of market imperfections and distortions (resulting, for
example, from taxes), the two approaches usually specify different discount
rates.37 Rates based on the opportunity cost of capital run significantly
higher than those based on the pure rate of time preference.38
Consequently, the very choice of discounting method can significantly
affect the outcome of a CBA and thereby influence policy.
A third approach to discounting uses the so-called “shadow price of
capital,” which starts by converting all mandated private capital
expenditures to annualized consumption equivalents using an estimate of
the pre-tax private rate of return to determine a cost-stream representing
foregone consumption.39 That foregone consumption is then converted to
present value, along with all other costs and benefits, using the
consumption rate of time preference.40 But the shadow price of capital
approach has not (yet) been widely adopted. The U.K. Treasury
experimented with it, though only briefly, for government policies and

34.
See IRVING FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME (1906); F.P. Ramsey, A
Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 ECON. J. 543 (1928).
35.
See, e.g., M.S. Feldstein, The Social Time Preference Discount Rate in Cost Benefit Analysis,
74 ECON. J. 360, 361 (1964).
36.
See, e.g., ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS 165 (1st ed. 1996).
37.
David F. Burgess & Richard O. Zerbe, Appropriate Discounting for Benefit–Cost Analysis, 2 J.
BENEFIT–COST ANALYSIS, no. 2, Apr. 2011, at art. 2.
38.
See id. at 4; BOARDMAN, supra note 36, at 169.
39.
See Jeffrey A. Kolb & Joel D. Scheraga, Discounting the Benefits and Costs of Environmental
Regulations, 9 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 381, 382 (1990).
40.
See, e.g., id.
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projects with significant effects on carbon emissions.41 Similarly, in the
U.S., the OMB briefly experimented with the shadow price of capital
approach to discounting. A 1992 rule established it as “the analytically
preferred means of capturing the effects of government projects on
resource allocation in the private sector,” and even permitted its use with
“OMB concurrence,” instead of the opportunity cost of capital approach
with its 7% constant discount rate.42 But just a few years later, the OMB
cautioned that “[w]hile the shadow price approach is theoretically
preferred, there are several practical challenges to its use. Agencies wishing
to use this methodology should consult with the OMB prior to doing so,
and should clearly explain their solutions to the methodological and
empirical challenges . . . .”43 In a similar vein, OMB Circular A-4, adopted
in 2003, cautioned agencies that “shadow prices are not well established for
the United States. Furthermore, the distribution of impacts from regulations
on capital and consumption are not always well known. Consequently, any
agency that wishes to tackle this challenging analytical task should check
with OMB before proceeding.”44 Since then, OMB rules have mandated
use of both the opportunity cost of investment approach and the marginal

41.
See ECON. GRP., DEP’T FOR ENV’T FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON
AND THE SHADOW PRICE OF CARBON: WHAT THEY ARE, AND HOW TO USE THEM IN ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL IN THE UK (2007), http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/emissions/valuation/shadow
_cost/shadow_cost.aspx#. Just a couple of years after adopting the shadow price of capital approach to
valuing carbon emissions, H.M. Treasury abandoned all efforts to price damages from carbon emissions
to focus instead on the abatement costs of attaining exogenously determined emission-reduction goals.
DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON VALUATION IN UK POLICY APPRAISAL: A REVISED
APPROACH (2009), https://www.decc.gov.uk/publications/basket.aspx?FilePath=What+we+do%5CA+
low+carbon+UK%5CCarbon+Valuation%5C1_20090715105804_e_%40%40_CarbonValuationinUKPol
icyAppraisal.pdf&filetype=4. See also DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE
CARBON VALUATION METHODOLOGY FOR UK POLICY APPRAISAL (2011), available at
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/cutting-emissions/carbon-valuation/3136-guide-carbonvaluation-methodology.pdf.
42.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-94 REVISED
(Oct. 29, 1992), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094 [hereinafter OMB
CIRCULAR NO. A-94 REVISED].
43.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (Jan. 11, 1996), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_riaguide#iii.
44.
OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 27, at 33. It is worth noting that the OMB’s changing attitude
to the shadow price of capital approach to discounting has political overtones, which are consistent with
the theme of this Article. That approach, which typically leads to lower discount rates than the
opportunity cost of capital approach, thereby justifying more government action, was embraced shortly
after a Democratic (Clinton) administration took office, but then pretty firmly abandoned shortly after a
Republican (Bush II) administration took office, although support for the approach did wane during
Clinton’s second term. This history supports a more general thesis that debates over CBA methodology
within the federal government reflect larger disputes about the size and scope of government
intervention in the economy and illustrates the extent to which CBA can be manipulated to preferred
political ends.
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rate of time preference approach to discounting, by requiring the use of
alternative 7% and 3% discount rates.45
But how are those values derived? The opportunity cost of capital
approach simply estimates the before-tax rate of return to private capital in
the U.S. economy over a number of years.46 The OMB has pegged that rate
at 7% since the early 1990s (when it was reduced from a 10% rate).47 The
marginal rate of time preference approach, by contrast, is not based on
simple market observations. Rather, the discount rate is estimated
according to the “Ramsey equation,” r=p+ηg, where: r is the social rate of
discount; p is the pure rate of time preference, a measure of (im)patience; η
is the elasticity of marginal utility, also known as the base-case coefficient
of relative risk aversion, which measures the amount of consumption
society is willing to sacrifice today to ensure against some expected future
loss; and g represents the expected rate of growth in per capita
consumption, a value economists typically presume to be positive because
they expect future generations to be better off than present generations.48
The g could turn negative, however, should some large-scale disaster occur,
such as a significant asteroid strike or catastrophic climate change.49
Indeed, the conventional presumption of long-term growth stems from
models that presume no resource or ecological constraints of any kind.
Once such constraints are introduced, the consequences for future
consumption become more ambiguous (even in the absence of external
shocks or discontinuities) and depend increasingly on factors including
relative resource endowments, the elasticity of substitution between natural
resources and other forms of capital, and the rate of technological change.50

45.
Id.
46.
See id.
47.
See OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-94 REVISED, supra note 42, at 9.
48.
On the presumptuousness of this expectation, see, e.g., Robert M. Solow, The Economics of
Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974), which states that:
We have actually done quite well at the hands of our ancestors. Given how poor they were
and how rich we are, they might properly have saved less and consumed more. No doubt
they never expected the rise in income per head that has made us so much richer than they
ever dreamed was possible. But that only reinforces the point that the future may be too
important to be left to the accident of mistaken expectations and the ups and downs of the
Protestant ethic.
Id. at 9. See also DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981)
(observing that long-run economic growth is not normal but exceptional in the history of human
civilization).
49.
As North, supra, note 48, reminds us, low or negative growth situations can arise not just from
large-scale exogenous shocks but endogenously from persistently bad institutions, which harm society
overall while benefiting interest groups possessing sufficient political prowess to prevent social
welfare-enhancing institutional change.
50.
See, e.g., Solow, supra note 48, at 10–11; Joseph Stiglitz, Growth with Exhaustible Natural
Resources: Efficient and Optimal Growth Paths, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 123 (1974).
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None of the elements comprising the Ramsey equation can be specified
objectively. They are all substantially subjective and subject to dispute, as
illustrated by the controversy that followed the U.K. Treasury’s 2006
publication of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change.51
The Stern Review derived an unusually low social discount rate of 1.4%
based on a pure rate of time preference of 0.1%, an elasticity of marginal
utility of 1, and an expected growth rate in per capita consumption of
1.3%.52 Many of the Stern Review’s numerous critics objected to its social
discount rate, but for various reasons. Some, including William Nordhaus
and Richard S.J. Tol, strongly disagreed with the selection of 0.1% for the
pure rate of time preference.53 Others, such as Partha Dasgupta, had no
complaint with the pure rate of time preference but disagreed with the Stern
Review’s elasticity of marginal utility of 1.54 Dasgupta did not dispute
Stern’s choice of a growth rate for per capita consumption, even though he
previously co-authored a paper noting how climate change, if sufficiently
severe, could curtail economic growth and potentially justify a zero, or
even negative, social discount rate.55 Martin Weitzman, after heavily
criticizing the Stern Review’s use of unconventional, paternalistic discount
rates,56 developed his own integrated assessment model—a complex form
of CBA fusing scientific and economic analyses—that pays more attention
to potential low or negative growth scenarios.57
Given the lack of agreement over the elements that comprise the social
discount rate, it should not be surprising to find widespread disagreement
about the social discount rate itself. Writing in 1999, Paul Portney and John
Weyant observed that “those looking for guidance on the choice of a
discount rate could find justification [in the literature] for a rate at or near
zero, as high as 20% and any and all values in between.”58 Not much has
changed in the years since. The wide range of justifiable social discount
51.
Stern, supra note 17. The analysis in this section is adapted from Daniel H. Cole, The Stern
Review and Its Critics: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Benefit–Cost Analysis, 48 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 53 (2008).
52.
Cole, supra note 51, at 61.
53.
See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus, A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 686 (2007); Gary W. Yohe & Richard S.J. Tol, The Stern Review:
Implications for Climate Change, 49 ENV’T 36 (2007).
54.
See Partha Dasgupta, Commentary: The Stern Review’s Economics of Climate Change, 199
NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 4 (2007).
55.
Partha Dasgupta, Karl-Göran Mäler & Scott Barrett, Intergenerational Equity, Social Discount
Rates, and Global Warming, in DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 14, at 51.
56.
Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 45
J. ECON. LITERATURE 703 (2007).
57.
Martin L. Weitzman, Gamma Discounting, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 260 (2001).
58.
DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 14, at 4. See also Feldstein,
supra note 35, at 362 (observing that “[t]he search for a ‘perfect’ formula to specify the social time
preference rate is futile. [A social time preference function] must reflect public policy and social ethics,
as well as judgment about future economic conditions.”).
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rates is troubling because even a seemingly small difference in the discount
rate can alter the outcome—in technical terms, change the sign—of a CBA.
A little more than a decade ago, Martin Weitzman tried to get a better
handle on what constituted an “appropriate” social discount rate for longrun environmental policies by surveying 2,000 of his fellow economists for
their “professionally considered gut feeling” about the appropriate rates to
apply to climate change policy.59 In the aggregate, they preferred a
schedule of declining discount rates, starting from around 4% for near-term
effects and falling to 2% after twenty-five years, then to 1% after seventyfive years.60 Weitzman’s project has been criticized on various grounds,
including, for example, that there is no reason to believe that most
economists have special expertise on discounting.61 However, his findings
(summarized in Table 1 below) are remarkably consistent with the U.K.
Treasury’s “Green Book” of discount rates for central government policies,
presented in Table 2. The U.K. Treasury rates presumably are based on the
shadow price of capital (presuming risk-free rate of returns) or on the pure
rate of time preference, rather than the opportunity cost of capital.62 By
contrast, the U.S. President’s Office of Management and Budget continues
to prefer the opportunity cost of capital approach for calculating social
discount rates.63 Its 7% base rate remains mandatory for all federal agency
CBAs, even for cases where the proposed government action does not
primarily affect capital markets.64 In 2003, the OMB instructed agencies to
use both 7% and 3% discount rates (see Table 3), thereby splitting the
difference between the opportunity cost of capital approach and the time
preference of consumption approach to discounting (although, in practice,
the OMB sometimes seems to give greater weight to calculations using the
7% rate).65

59.
Weitzman, supra note 57, at 266 (emphasis omitted).
60.
Id. at 261.
61.
See, e.g., Burgess & Zerbe, supra note 37, at 12.
62.
H.M. TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK: APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
99 (2003), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/green_book_complete.pdf.
63.
OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 27.
64.
OMB CIRCULAR A-94 REVISED, supra note 42, subsequently superseded by OMB CIRCULAR
A-4, supra note 27, as it relates to discounting in RIAs.
65.
OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 27.
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Table 1. Aggregation of Economists’ Recommended Discount Rates for
Climate Change Policy
Time from present
Discount Rate (%)
1–5 years
4
6–25 years
3
26–75 years
2
76–300 years
1
More than 300 years
0
Source: Martin Weitzman, Gamma Discounting, 9 AMER. ECON. REV. 260, 261
(2001).
Table 2. U.K. Treasury’s Schedule of Declining Long-Term Discount Rates
Period of years
Discount rate (%)
0–30
3.5
31–75
3
76–125
2.5
126–200
2
201–300
1.5
301+
1
Source: H.M. TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK: APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION IN
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 99 (2003), available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/green_book_complete.pdf.
Table 3. The OMB’s Discount Rates for Federal Agencies
Discount rate (%)
Time period

1+ years
Intergenerational (more
than 20 years)

Should be
used in all
RIAs
7
7

Should be
used in all
RIAs
3
3

Permitted for sensitivity
analysis in RIAs with
intergenerational effects
—
1–3

Source: OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR A-4, in INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (2003).
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Moreover, the OMB permits the use of even lower discount rates,
ranging from 1%–3%, in RIAs with intergenerational effects for purposes
of “sensitivity analysis” (along with mandatory 7% and 3% rates).66 Thus,
OMB rules countenance the use of alternative discount rates, based on
different presumptions, for regulatory analysis. Policy-makers who say to
economists, “[j]ust give me a number,”67 instead receive two or more
numbers, which cannot simply be averaged or otherwise combined into a
single number, thereby complicating the decision-making process. Indeed,
it is by no means clear that legislators or high-ranking political appointees
in the agencies understand or appreciate the nuances of discounting and
discount-rate choice. This is not to argue that analysts should necessarily
cater to the desires of politicians and other policy makers for simple
calculations. Sometimes, at least, decision makers need to be seriously
confronted with reasonable and potentially irreducible uncertainties. But
introducing additional complexity into CBA calculations does come at a
cost.
To appreciate how using multiple discount rates within a single CBA
can confuse decision makers, imagine a policy that upon implementation
would impose costs on polluters and administrators amounting to $1
million but would produce estimated social benefits of $2 million in exactly
fifteen years. For the sake of simplicity, assume no costs or benefits are
created during the intervening years.
While this example is highly stylized, it captures a chief characteristic
of certain public policies, such as environmental protection measures: costs
tend to be front-loaded, while benefits tend to be back-loaded. The costs
that are borne now (in year 0) are not subject to discounting, but the
subsequent benefits are discounted. The standard discounting equation is
PV = FV/(1+i)t, where PV is present value, FV is future value, i is the
annual interest rate, and t is the time.68 The algebraic “discount factor,” 1/(1
+ i)t, can be used to generate a table of numerical discount factors for
different time periods. The discount factor for a 3% discount rate in fifteen
66.
“Sensitivity analysis” denotes a test carried out to determine the extent to which the outcome of
a CBA is an artifact of the analyst’s assumptions. The goal (not always attainable) is to prevent
analysts’ subjective choices from determining CBA results. A policy that is “insensitive” to the choice
of a 3% or 7% discount rate—net social benefits are derived using either rate—is more certain to
enhance net social welfare than a policy that provides net social benefits under the lower, but not the
higher, discount rate. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that only policies that provide net
social benefits under discount rates of both 3% and 7% should be implemented; that would be
tantamount to using a single discount rate of 7%. Arguably, for policies that do not primarily and
substantially affect capital markets, the use of 7% discount rate in the CBA is unwarranted, even as part
of a sensitivity analysis.
67.
Mark A. Moore et al., “Just Give Me a Number!” Practical Values for the Social Discount
Rate, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 789, 789 (2004).
68.
NICK HANLEY & CLIVE L. SPLASH, COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16
(1993).
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years is 0.642; the discount factor for a 7% discount rate in fifteen years is
0.362. Applying these discount factors to the current hypothetical, using the
OMB’s mandatory 7% discount rate, the present value (that is, the value in
year 0) of $2 million in benefits accrued in year 15 is $724,000 (2,000,000
x 0.362). Because that product is less than the costs incurred in year 0
(1,000,000), the policy would not pass the cost–benefit test and should not
be implemented. But using the alternative 3% discount rate, the present
value of the benefits earned in year 15 is $1,284,000 (2,000,000 x 0.642),
which exceeds the cost, and therefore passes the cost–benefit test. What
should the government do with this information? If it relies on the 3%
discount rate, it should implement the policy; but if it uses the 7% discount
rate, it should not. One way or the other, the inherently subjective choice of
a discount rate alone determines the CBA’s outcome and drives the policy
decision.69
Given the various subjective and manipulable elements of CBA, why
does government increasingly rely on it as a tool in policymaking? The
reasons are several: (1) despite the subjective elements described above,
CBAs have an aura of neutrality and appear more scientific than other
decision tools; (2) decision makers like CBAs because they can boil down
fundamental questions of regulatory policy to a single number (or a set of
numbers, reflecting a clearly delineated variation in parameter values or a
probability distribution of outcomes, if a Monte Carlo simulation is run),
which creates the impression (or misimpression) that the policy choice is
(at least relatively speaking) clear;70 (3) even if CBAs are subjective and
manipulable, other decision tools are no less subjective and manipulable;
and (4) because formal CBAs specify assumptions, valuations, discount
rates and other variables, they are relatively transparent and capable of
replication or challenge.71
The last two reasons are probably sufficient to warrant CBAs for most,
if not all, major regulatory decisions (but perhaps not for minor decisions
where the costs of performing the CBA may not be worth the benefits).
Problems of subjectivity and manipulability affect all decision tools, but in
the absence of a formalized process such as CBA, assumptions and
valuations are likely to remain unspecified and opaque, preventing policy
analysts, the media, and interest groups from reviewing, challenging,

69.
Accord Aaron Wildavsky, The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost–Benefit Analysis, Systems
Analysis, and Program Budgeting, 26 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292, 297 (1966).
70.
It should be noted that many (if not all) economists who advocate the use of CBA in regulatory
decision making do so not as a decision-rule but as one source of information among others. See
Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit–Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation?, 272 SCI. 221 (1996).
71.
See Wildavsky, supra note 69, at 297 (“The great advantage of cost–benefit analysis, when
pursued with integrity, is that some implicit judgments are made explicit and subject to analysis.”).
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replicating, or even simply understanding why a particular decision was
taken, rather than some other decision.72 Indeed, decision makers
sometimes have strategic incentives to prefer the relative opacity of
informal decision-making procedures. Particularly in such circumstances,
the transparency offered by formal CBAs is a great virtue, which should
not be underestimated.73 It can, and has, served to check abuses in agency
decision-making processes, as the next section illustrates.
II. THE USE AND ABUSE OF CBA IN PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS
This section offers three case studies that, together, describe legitimate
uses as well as abuses of CBA to either resolve or impede the resolution of
social-cost problems. The first case study concerns CBAs prepared by the
EPA in the late 1990s in support of revised national ambient air quality
standards for ozone and particulate matter. The main lesson of that case
study is that it makes sense for the EPA to support its rules with CBAs even
when it is legally barred from considering them in rulemaking because they
help to undercut political opposition to new rules.
The second case study concerns the Obama Administration’s more
recent but unsuccessful effort to replace the George W. Bush
Administration’s air quality standard for ozone with a more stringent
standard. Relenting in the face of political opposition based partly on the
state of the economy, the Obama Administration was disabled from
defending its proposed standards on economic grounds because the
agency’s own Regulatory Impact Analysis showed that the Bush standard
yielded (on central estimates) higher net social benefits.
The third case study focuses on the EPA’s efforts to support the Bush
Administration’s “Clear Skies” program—a deceptively named legislative
package designed mainly to avoid imposing tougher restrictions on
72.
One group that seems immune (or, at least, resistant) to the information provided by CBAs is
the general public. As Cass Sunstein has observed in the context of the Bush Administration’s
reconsideration of Clinton Administration drinking water standards for arsenic, “Ordinary people seem
to be ‘intuitive toxicologists,’ with a set of simple rules for thinking about environmental risks.” Cass R.
Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2262 (2002). Sunstein goes on to argue that
such intuitive approaches to policy are likely to lead to mistaken judgments and socially-inefficient
outcomes, strengthening the case for CBA as a corrective. Id. at 2266. The controversy over the arsenic
rule is discussed further infra notes 137 and 166.
73.
Lisa Heinzerling argues that the transparency of CBA is illusory because agency explanations
of policies based on CBAs are not obviously more transparent than agency explanations of policies not
based on CBAs. See Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2311, 2335–37 (2002).
However, her argument conflates two distinct issues: (1) the transparency of CBAs and (2) the
transparency of decisions based, in whole or in part, on CBAs. Nothing in CBAs guarantees that agency
decisions, or explanations of decisions, will be any more transparent. But the CBAs themselves must be
transparent and replicable—assumptions, including valuations of non-market goods and discount rates,
must be explicit—to qualify as legitimate CBAs. And their transparency has, in fact, contributed
positively to policy-making, as shown by the third case study in Part II., infra.
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polluters—by manipulating the economic analysis to make “Clear Skies”
appear superior to alternative, more stringent policies.74 While this case
demonstrates the manipulability of CBAs, it also highlights the value of
their transparency for determining best policies for providing public goods
or resolving collective-action problems.
These three case studies are not intended to present a comprehensive
picture of the myriad uses and abuses of CBA in political/regulatory
processes; many more case studies would be required to accomplish that
goal. Those presented here should be sufficient, however, to accomplish the
more modest aim of this Article, which is to describe and assess some of
the more important ways in which CBAs have in fact been: (1) used to (a)
support social welfare-enhancing regulations and (b) impede regulations
that would likely reduce social welfare; and (2) abused to mislead policy
makers, and the public, about the social welfare consequences of favored or
disfavored regulatory or legislative proposals. The case studies presented
here do not describe the full range of uses and abuses of CBA but suggest
some implications and conclusions about the overall utility of the method
as a decision tool.
Case Study 1: CBA Can Facilitate Collective Action by Disarming Political
Opposition
In 1997, the EPA proposed amendments75 to national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQSs) for ozone and particulate matter under the
Clean Air Act.76 The proposed regulations, which the EPA ultimately
adopted, were significantly more stringent than the previous standards, and
entailed substantial costs for both regulated industries and cities that could
not immediately attain the new standards.77 In setting the revised standards,
however, the EPA was legally barred from considering those costs. Section
109 of the Clean Air Act requires the agency to set primary NAAQSs that
allow “an adequate margin of safety . . . to protect the public health.”78
Since its inception, the EPA has consistently interpreted that language to
prohibit considerations of cost in setting or revising NAAQSs.79 That
74.
See JAMES E. MCCARTHY & LARRY B. PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33165, COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF CLEAR SKIES: EPA’S ANALYSIS OF MULTI-POLLUTANT CLEAN AIR BILLS (2005).
75.
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652-01 (July
18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. prt. 50).
76.
Clean Air Act of 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401
et seq. (2006)).
77.
See 40 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1999) (particulate matter standard); 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9 to 50.10 (1999)
(ozone standard).
78.
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006).
79.
See Lead Industries Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir., 1980)
(upholding the EPA’s interpretation of § 109 of the Clean Air Act to prohibit cost considerations in
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interpretation is based in part on the fact that other provisions in the Clean
Air Act expressly permit or even require consideration of costs,80
suggesting that Congress’s failure to include any reference to costs in § 109
was both deliberate and legally significant (if, perhaps, economically
imprudent).
Although the EPA is statutorily barred from considering costs in
setting revised NAAQSs, the agency nevertheless prepares CBAs in setting
or revising those standards because it is legally obligated to do so by a
different statute and an executive order. The 1995 Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act requires federal agencies to conduct cost–benefit analyses of
all regulations entailing annual economic costs of $100 million or more.81
The Act also requires the agencies to adopt the economically least
burdensome regulatory alternative that accomplishes the regulatory purpose
or to explain why they chose a different option.82 Executive Order (E.O.)
12,866, issued in 1993 by President Clinton, required executive branch
agencies, including the EPA, to prepare cost–benefit analyses for any
“significant” regulatory proposals, that is, proposals having annual
economic effects of $100 million or more.83 Unlike the Reagan era E.O. it
superseded,84 however, the Clinton E.O. did not require that the benefits of
proposed regulations exceed the costs.85 It did, however, require the EPA to
prepare CBAs, even when it could not legally consider them in making
regulatory decisions, as when setting national ambient air quality standards
under the Clean Air Act.86
The EPA complied with both the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
E.O. 12,866 by duly preparing CBAs for its proposed revisions to the
NAAQSs for ozone and particulate matter.87 The CBA for the ozone
standard failed a strict cost–benefit test, with estimated benefits ranging
from $0.1–$1.5 billion (net present value) and estimated costs of $2.5
setting or revising NAAQSs); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (confirming
the EPA’s interpretation that costs cannot be considered in setting NAAQSs).
80.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006) (expressly requiring the EPA to consider costs in
establishing technology-based standards of performance for new stationary sources of pollution
emissions).
81.
2 U.S.C. §§ 658–658(g) (2006).
82.
Id.
83.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,738 (Oct. 4, 1993). The Clinton E.O. has since been
amended by E.O.’s promulgated by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. See Exec. Order
No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 28, 2002); Exec. Order 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007);
Exec. Order 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
84.
See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981); Exec. Order 12,498, 50 Fed.
Reg. 1036 (Jan. 8, 1985).
85.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,738 (Oct. 4, 1993).
86.
Id.
87.
See Lester B. Lave, EPA’s Proposed Air Quality Standards: Clean Air Sense, The Brookings
Institute, Summer 1997, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1997/06/summer-environmentlave. All figures are in 1997 dollars.
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billion.88 By contrast, the CBA for the revised particulate matter NAAQS
had estimated benefits of $58–$110 billion, which exceeded by at least a
factor of ten the estimated cost of $6 billion.89 But was this exercise in
CBA simply a waste of time and resources? Perhaps, if one is prepared to
believe the EPA actually refrained from considering costs in deciding
whether or not to change the standards. The fact that the EPA has only
rarely changed NAAQSs, even though the Clean Air Act requires it to
consider doing so at least every five years,90 suggests that cost does play an
important, if informal, role in the EPA’s decision making. But even if the
EPA set the revised NAAQSs for ozone and particulate matter without
regard to its own CBAs, those CBAs came in very handy when the agency
was forced to defend its revised standards against political opposition in
Congress.
As Jason Scott Johnston has observed, “When agencies pursue policies
or programs that are opposed by party leaders, they risk triggering
congressional reaction, not only in the form of costly oversight hearings, at
which they will be grilled for hours by hostile committee members, but also
in the form of reduced future appropriations.”91 Congress may also attempt
to nullify or overturn regulatory policies through legislation, as the EPA
discovered when it revised the NAAQSs for ozone and particulate matter in
1997. The regulations provoked a great hue and cry from cities and
industries that would bear significant new costs under the regulations.92
The Republican-controlled House and Senate held oversight hearings on
the new standards,93 and proposals were made in Congress to undo them.94
But those efforts went nowhere. That in itself is not unusual; exceedingly

88.
Id.
89.
See id.
90.
42 USC § 7409(d)(2)(B) (2006).
91.
Jason Scott Johnston, A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory
Cost–Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1362 (2002). Johnston’s game theoretic model of
agency behavior relative to CBA focuses on litigation/judicial review rather than legislative/regulatory
oversight.
92.
See, e.g., Vicki Torres, Firms Push for Some Breathing Room, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1997, at
D9; Cleaner Air? Tougher standards pose a headache for cities and states, HOUS. CHRON., July 14,
1997, at 20; James M. Lents, A Review of National Ozone and Particulate Matter Air Quality Standards
in Light of Long-Standing California Air Quality Standards, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 415, 415–16 (1998).
93.
See, e.g., Clean Air Act: Ozone and Particulate Matter Standards: Hearings Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety and the Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 105th Cong. 105-50 (1997) [hereinafter Hearings],
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105shrg45560/pdf/CHRG-105shrg45560.pdf.
94.
See, e.g., S. 1084, 105th Cong. (1997), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c105:S.1084.IS: (bill to reinstate original ozone and particulate matter standards); H.R.
1984, 105th Cong. (1997), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:H.R.1984.IH: (bill
to impose four-year moratorium on new ozone and particulate matter standards).
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few legislative proposals ever become law.95 In this case, however, it is
worth considering whether the CBAs the EPA prepared for its revised
ozone and particulate matter standards might have helped at least to quell
the opposition. The net benefits of the particulate matter standard were so
immense as to be robust to any reasonable sensitivity analyses (e.g.,
altering of the discount rate), and so could well have pulled the rug out
from under the EPA’s opponents.
Whether the CBAs prepared by the EPA affected the outcome of the
policy dispute in Congress is, of course, speculative. A cursory review of
the Senate’s hearings on the NAAQSs indicates that they may have had an
effect, as senators who opposed the standards expressly denied that the
issue was economic (in stark contrast to arguments raised about the Obama
Administration’s proposed changes in the ozone standards, addressed in the
next case study).96 Instead, senators focused their attacks on the scientific
basis for the standards, which was, in fact, quite strong.97 Apparently, they
realized that even if they amended § 109 of the Clean Air Act to require
that NAAQSs be based on a cost–benefit analysis, this provision would not
avail them, at least in the case of the revised particulate matter standard.98
This case study shows that, even in cases where CBAs are not legally
required or cannot be legally considered, they may play the valuable
political role of muting political opposition that otherwise might succeed in
overturning welfare-enhancing regulations.99 By the same token, a carefully
prepared CBA indicating that a proposed regulatory change would create
significant net social costs can negate political support for such a change,
as the next case study illustrates.
Case Study II: CBA Exposes and Impedes Inefficient Regulation
If CBA proved politically beneficial to the EPA’s efforts to strengthen
ozone standards in the late 1990s, it probably contributed to the downfall of
a similar Obama Administration effort in 2011. The story begins in 2008
95.
In the 109th Congress, the Senate and House considered a total of 10,537 proposals, according
OF
CONGRESS,
to
the
Library
of
Congress’s
Thomas.gov
website.
LIBRARY
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/Browse.php?n=bills&c=109 (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). According to the
same site, 483 bills, or 4.5% of those proposals, were signed by the President. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php (search for bills signed by President during the 109th
Congress) (last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
96.
See Hearings, supra note 93.
97.
Id.
98.
Both rules were upheld on judicial review. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457
(2001). However, litigation on technical issues did succeed in delaying implementation of the 1997
ozone standard. See, e.g., Allison D. Wood, Implementing EPA’s 8-Hour Ozone Standard, Round Two,
18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2004, at 16.
99.
This assumes, of course, that the agency’s CBA was accurate at least with respect to the “sign”
of net benefits or costs.
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when, pursuant to a mandatory five-year review of the national ambient air
quality standards for ozone, the George W. Bush Administration
announced that it would amend the standard set in 1997 by the Clinton
Administration from 84 parts per billion (ppb) to 75 ppb.100 Oddly for a
proposal to strengthen environmental standards—a rare enough event
during the Bush Administration—environmentalists and even EPA’s own
scientists were outraged. The EPA’s scientific advisory committee (SAC)
had unanimously recommended setting the new standard no higher, and
preferably lower, than 70 ppb.101 After EPA Administrator Stephen
Johnson published the new 75 ppb standard, in a rule that expressly
referred to the SAC’s findings but ignored its recommendations, the SAC
took the highly unusual step of sending Administrator Johnson a
unanimous follow-up letter expressing its disappointment and disagreement
with the new standard.102
Why did the Bush EPA select a new ozone standard significantly
higher (i.e., less stringent) than its own SAC recommended? The final rule
referred to “uncertainties” about health effects at lower ambient
concentration levels of ozone.103 In the press, Administrator Johnson
explained that he took the SAC’s recommendations into account but simply
disagreed with them.104 But why did he disagree with them? The RIA for
the rule suggests the answer. It compared the costs and benefits of various
standards, including 65 ppb, 70 ppb, 75 ppb, and 79 ppb, using alternative
3% and 7% discount rates.105 The net benefits of the selected standard of 75
ppb, based on the median value of all point estimates, amounted to $0.8
billion.106 The 79 ppb alternative had a similar cost–benefit profile but
would have been even harder for the Bush Administration to defend on
scientific grounds.107 The more stringent standards preferred by the SAC
would have entailed significantly lower net social benefits or even net
social costs (on central estimates) according to the Bush EPA’s

100.
See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436, 16,439 (Mar.
27, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50 and 58).
101.
See Letter from Dr. Rogene Henderson, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Comm. to
Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Oct. 24, 2006), at 1–2,
http://envirohealth.berkeley.edu/271E/2007/S5/CASACtoEPAOct2006Ozone.pdf.
102.
See id.
103.
See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436, 16,437
(proposed Mar. 27, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50 and 58).
104.
Associated Press, States, Activists Sue EPA over New Smog Rules, May 28, 2008, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24846273/ns/us_news-environment/t/states-activists-sue-epa-over-newsmog-rules/.
105.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-08-003, FINAL OZONE NAAQS REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS, 7-5 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/452_R_08_003.pdf.
106.
See id. at 7-6.
107.
Id.
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calculations.108 Of course, Administrator Johnson could not have publicly
defended his decision revising the standard to 75 ppb, instead of a more
stringent standard, based on that CBA. To do so would have been to
confess a deliberate violation of the Clean Air Act.
EPA scientists, environmental groups, and state officials were
unconvinced by Administrator Johnson’s facile defense of the new 75 ppb
ozone standard. On May 27, 2008, the American Lung Association,
Environmental Defense Fund, Earth Justice, the Natural Resources Defense
Council, and other non-governmental plaintiffs filed a notice of intent to
sue.109 The same day, fourteen state attorneys general filed suit in the D.C.
Circuit, claiming that EPA’s ozone standard was arbitrary and capricious
because it ignored the recommendations of its own scientific advisory
committee without reasonable explanation.110
Before the case could be heard, the Bush Administration left office and
the Obama Administration took over. In short order, the Obama EPA
announced its intention of settling the states’ lawsuit by reconsidering its
predecessor’s ozone standard.111 On November 1, 2010, EPA
Administrator Lisa Jackson filed a motion in the D.C. Circuit requesting
abeyance of the lawsuit, while her agency proceeded with a promised
reconsideration of the Bush Administration’s 75 ppb standard for ozone.112
The plaintiffs asked the court to hold the EPA’s feet to the fire by requiring
an expedited rulemaking for reconsidering the standards.113 The EPA
responded with a revised motion for abeyance on December 8, 2010,

108.
See id. at 7-6, fig. 7.1. It is instructive to compare the Bush Administration’s RIA for its 2008
ozone rule with the RIA prepared by the Obama Administration pursuant to its reconsideration of that
rule. See infra, Table 4. Apparently, the few minor methodological changes introduced by the Obama
EPA yielded higher net social benefits for each alternative standard considered, without any changes in
the social discount rate. Those methodological changes included: (1) removal (as recommended by the
National Academy of Sciences) of the Bush Administration’s assumption of no causality for ozone
mortality; (2) the inclusion of two additional ozone multi-city studies (again, as recommended by the
NAS); and (3) upward revision of the value of a statistical life to make it consistent with the value used
in other EPA analyses. See EPA, SUMMARY OF THE UPDATED REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (RIA)
FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE 2008 OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARD
(NAAQS),
S1-1
to
S1-2,
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/s1supplemental_analysis_summary11-5-09.pdf.
109.
See Petition for Review at 1, Am. Lung Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-1203 (D.C.
Cir., May 27, 2008), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/legal_docs/
petition-for-review.pdf.
110.
Timothy Gardner, States Sue EPA over Ozone Pollution Standards, REUTERS, May 28, 2008,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/05/28/us-ozone-suit-states-idUSN284310
8220080528.
111.
Brent Kendall, EPA to Reconsider Bush-Era Smog Rules, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2009,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125310162132515625.html.
112.
EPA’s Revised Motion Requesting a Continued Abeyance and Response to the State
Petitioners’ Cross-Motion, at 3 Mississippi v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-1200 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 8,
2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/ozonepollution/pdfs/20101208motion.pdf.
113.
Id.
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stipulating an August 12, 2011 deadline for final action, to which the court
agreed.114 As we shall see, the Obama EPA’s decision to voluntarily
reconsider the Bush Administration’s ozone standard—rather than wait for
a court order that probably would have vacated the rule—was politically
shortsighted.
While the Obama Administration held hearings and reviewed the
science upon which the Bush rule had been based, electric utilities and
other industries that would bear the brunt of costly emissions reductions
necessary to meet a more stringent standard vocally opposed any change in
the rule.115 When a new Republican majority took over in the U.S. House
of Representatives following the 2010 midterm elections, they started
referring to the EPA as a “job-killing” agency that was obstructing a return
to economic growth in the U.S.116 Unfortunately, in the case of the ozone
standard, their generally baseless arguments correlating job increases or
losses to social welfare received a modicum of support from the Obama
EPA’s revised RIA, as described in Table 4 below. The proposed rule
passed a cost–benefit test (on median estimates), but the Bush
Administration’s 0.075 ppm standard was found to yield higher (median)
net social benefits than the alternative Obama standards of 0.070 ppm or
0.065 ppm (using either a 7% or 3% discount rate).

114.
See id.
115.
See Letter from Andrew N. Liveris, Chairman & CEO, Dow Chem. Co. to Hon. William
Daley, Chief of Staff to the President (July 15, 2011), http://thehill.com/images/stories/blogs/energy/
brt.pdf.
116.
See Ben German, Upton’s Agenda: Kill the House Climate Change Committee, Battle “Job
Killing” EPA Rules, THE HILL, E2 WIRE (Oct. 19, 2010, 10:55 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2wire/677-e2-wire/124795-uptons-agenda-kill-the-house-climate-change-committee-battle-job-killingepa-rules; Erica Martinson, EPA to Be GOP Target in 2012, POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2011, 10:35 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/68265.html. The casual presumption correlating social
welfare with the number of jobs in the economy is, of course, fallacious. A policy that maximizes a
social welfare function may reduce, increase, or leave unchanged the overall rate of (un)employment.
For this reason, employment effects of regulatory policies are not part of agency CBAs, although they
are often included separately in RIAs.
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Table 4. The EPA’s Estimated Median Net Social Benefits of Alternative
Ozone Standards in 2008 and 2010 (aggregating point estimates under both
7% and 3% discount rates)
Standard
0.075 ppm*
0.070 ppm
0.065 ppm
Bush
$0.9 billion
-$4.0 billion
-$9.0 billion
RIA
Obama
$3.1 billion
$1.4 billion
$0.7 billion
RIA
* Bush Administration’s chosen standard
Source: EPA, SUMMARY OF THE UPDATED REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
(RIA) FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE 2008 OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR
QUALITY STANDARD (NAAQS), S3-19, fig. S3.6 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/s1-supplemental_analysis_full.pdf.

As the deadline loomed for the Obama EPA’s final decision on
reconsideration of the Bush ozone standard, the economic recovery
stagnated and the national unemployment rate hovered stubbornly around
9%.117 President Obama’s job-approval rating fell to a low of 43.5%,118 just
as he was preparing to launch his reelection campaign. In the
circumstances, he could scarce afford to squander precious political capital
on new or revised environmental rules that would not clearly and
demonstrably improve net social welfare relative to existing standards.
Notwithstanding strong scientific support for tougher standards and the
Clean Air Act’s blanket prohibition on cost-considerations in the setting or
revising of national ambient air quality standards, the perceived political
costs of ignoring the economic costs of EPA’s rulemaking were simply too
high. Consequently, on September 2, 2011 President Obama told EPA
Administrator Jackson to abandon reconsideration of the Bush
Administration’s ozone standard.119
The President and other administration officials offered several, not
entirely consistent or convincing, reasons for withdrawing the new ozone
proposal. Cass Sunstein, head of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) within the OMB, provided a straightforward economic
justification for the decision: “We’re committed to protecting public health

117.
News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—August 2011 (Sept. 2,
2011), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_09022011.pdf.
118.
See
President
Obama
Job
Approval,
REALCLEARPOLITICS.COM,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/president_obama_job_approval-1044.html (adjust date
range on approval rating graph to show data for Jan. 2009–Sept. 2011) (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
119.
See John M. Broder, Obama Administration Abandons a Stricter Limit on Air Pollution, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2011, at A1.
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and welfare, but in a way that’s attuned to the economic situation.”120
While that was an accurate statement of the OIRA’s mission within the
OMB, it directly conflicts with § 109 of the Clean Air Act, which requires
the EPA to set national ambient air quality standards based only on the best
available science concerning health effects.121 No doubt for that reason, the
official “return letter” Sunstein sent to the EPA Administrator on
September 2, under President Obama’s instruction, did not mention cost
but focused instead on regulatory “uncertainty” the proposed rule would
create for affected industries and municipalities, especially given the
statutory requirement that the rule be reconsidered yet again in 2013.122 The
President, himself, focused on the issue of timing: “Ultimately, I did not
support asking State and local governments to begin implementing a new
standard that will soon be reconsidered.”123
The President’s assertion was technically accurate but misleading. The
Clean Air Act requires reconsideration of national ambient air quality
standards for each regulated (“criteria”) pollutant every five years.124 The
ozone standard is, as noted, scheduled for statutory review again in 2013;125
it must be reviewed then regardless of what the EPA did in 2011 (with
potential judicial review of a 2011 EPA rule stretching into 2012 or even
2013). The President’s expressed concern with asking state and local
governments to implement a new standard that would soon be reconsidered
is itself a cost consideration and reflects his political calculation that new,
more stringent ozone standards, established prior to the 2012 presidential
election, were not worth defending.126
Political and economic cost calculations aside, the President’s
expressed concern with the mandatory 2013 review of the ozone standard
was misleading because five-year reviews of NAAQSs only rarely result in

120.
Juliet Eilperin & Peter Wallsten, Obama’s Strategy Confounds Allies, Foes, WASH. POST,
Sept. 4, 2011 at A1 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs). According
to a New York Times exposé about the ozone decision, Sunstein had been “itching to send a return
letter” to “make his mark” as OIRA chief. John M. Broder, Re-election Strategy Is Tied to a Shift on
Smog, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at A20. Whether or not that is true, he could not have issued a
“return letter” based on cost considerations, as the article suggests, because of the plain language of the
statute forbidding consideration of costs in setting NAAQSs.
121.
See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
122.
Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa Jackson,
Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ozone_
national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf.
123.
Presidential Statement on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 2011 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 605 (Sept. 2, 2011). But see Broder, supra note 120, at A1 (claiming that, in addition
to the timing issue, the President was concerned with “the cost and the uncertainty it would impose on
industry and local governments”).
124.
42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (2006).
125.
See Letter from Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1.
126.
See Broder, supra note 119.
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actual changes to the standards.127 New standards set in 2011 would not
necessarily have to be changed again in 2013. Moreover, the
Administration must have known about the mandatory five-year review at
the time it asked the D.C. Circuit for an abeyance from filed lawsuits to
reconsider the Bush standards.128 If timing was not an issue in late 2010,
why was it suddenly an issue in mid-2011? Perhaps the President was
simply signaling his base of his intention to resurrect the revised ozone
standards in 2013, should he be reelected in 2012.129 It is clear, in any case,
that his decision not to reset the ozone standards in 2011 was not based
solely on science, as the Clean Air Act expressly requires.
To what extent did the RIA contribute to President Obama’s decision
to abandon reconsideration of the ozone standards? According to a New
York Times story, it played a significant (though not the only) part.130
Moreover, we can observe that the Administration has not similarly
retreated from other proposed environmental regulations, including new
rules for mercury emissions from powerplants.131 As it happens, the RIA
for the mercury proposal indicates sizeable net social benefits ranging from
$37 billion to $90 billion (using a 3% discount rate), and those net benefits
are relatively insensitive to the choice of a 3% or 7% discount rate.132 The
mercury rule was finalized on December 16, 2011.133 Time will tell
whether the highly positive CBA successfully insulates it from a threatened
rollback by Congress.134 If the first case study of this Article is any
indication, Congress should find it more difficult to do so because the
regulation provides clear, demonstrable, and defensible net social benefits.
In any case, the Obama Administration is not backtracking from its

127.
See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 870 F. 2d 892, 898–99 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that
revision of NAAQSs is not mandatory after the Administrator’s review).
128.
See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
129.
This is not to say that President Obama was either right or wrong to abandon reconsideration
of the Bush ozone standards. The analysis here is positive, not normative. However, the decision
evidently was based on considerations of cost—both economic and political—despite the plain
language of the Clean Air Act.
130.
Broder, supra note 119.
131.
See Eilperin & Wallsten, supra note 120.
132.
Using a 7% discount rate, the range of net social benefits is $33 billion to $81 billion. U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-11-011, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL
MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS, ES-1 (2011), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/
matsriafinal.pdf.
133.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR
POLLUTANTS FROM COAL- AND OIL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING UNITS AND
STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR FOSSIL-FUEL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY, INDUSTRIALCOMMERCIAL-INSTITUTIONAL, AND SMALL INDUSTRIAL-COMMERCIAL-INSTITUTIONAL STEAM
GENERATING UNITS (2011), http://www.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/20111216MATSfinal.pdf.
134.
See Lee Bergquist, Congress Likely to Challenge EPA’s Proposed Mercury-Emission Rules,
MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, Mar. 16, 2011, available at http://www.jsonline.com/business/118140259.
html.
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proposed mercury rule despite attacks from the right on costly and “jobkilling” EPA regulations. The question arises, would President Obama have
stood by the mercury rule had its CBA been negative, as with the
reconsidered ozone standard? Also, would he have abandoned
reconsideration of the ozone standard, had its CBA shown greater social
benefits?
The takeaway lesson from this case study is that costs, both economic
and political, appear to matter, even when the law says they cannot.
However, while costs always matter, they are not always decisive. In the
past, the EPA has promulgated regulations, including national air quality
standards, which have failed to provide (according to the EPA’s own
estimates) significant net social benefits.135 For example, the EPA’s RIA
for its 1997 revisions of the ozone NAAQSs derived a range of net benefits
from negative $0.7 billion to positive $1.0 billion, which yields a central
estimate little better than break even.136 Just how much of a role CBA will
play in the success or failure of any regulation is difficult to predict before
the fact. Costs always matter, but so too do other important, sometimes
countervailing, considerations and circumstances.137 Cost apparently has
been no object, for example, in the promulgation of new and very costly
“homeland security” regulations since “9/11.”138

135.
Arguably, it is becoming more difficult for agencies to do so, given the increased regulatory
oversight exercised by the OMB, not to mention congressional committees.
136.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR THE PARTICULATE
MATTER AND OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND PROPOSED REGIONAL HAZE
RULE, ES-20 (1997), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/naaqsfin/ria/ria0-5.pdf. In that case, it was
politically helpful that the ozone rule was packaged together with a new particulate matter (PM)
standard, which had very high net social benefits, so that the combined net benefits from both rules
were quite high. Had the ozone standard been issued by itself, the somewhat negative cost–benefit
balance might have made it more susceptible to political reversal.
137.
Shortly after President George W. Bush took office, the EPA announced that it was
suspending and reconsidering the Clinton Administration’s lately-adopted drinking water standard for
arsenic under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(f) (2006). That effort was abandoned in the
face of strong public opposition to weakening drinking water standards for known carcinogens. See
Sunstein, supra note 72, at 2262. The Clinton rule had reset the standard from 50 parts per billion (ppb)
to 10 ppb. The CBA for the standard strongly supported a tightening of the standard from the
preexisting 50 parts per billion, but was ambiguous as to whether social welfare would be maximized
with the standard at 10 ppb or 20 ppb. In reconsidering the Clinton rule, the Bush Administration did
not propose returning to the status quo ante, but instead wanted to raise the standard from 10 ppb to 20
ppb. The real stakes at issue got lost in the political battle, which ultimately forced the Bush
Administration to reinstate the Clinton rule of 10 ppb. The outcome of that battle was not significantly
affected by the EPA’s CBA, but it did spur an interesting colloquy on the legitimacy of CBA in the
regulatory process, published in the Georgetown Law Review. See Sunstein, supra note 72; Heinzerling,
supra note 73; Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341 (2002); Cass
R. Sunstein, In Praise of Numbers: A Reply, 90 GEO. L.J. 2379 (2002).
138.
See generally JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM
INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM (2006); JOHN
MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS,
AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2011).
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Case Study III: Blatant Abuse of CBA and the Vital Check of
Transparency139
In the mid-2000s, the George W. Bush Administration promoted a
group of bills known collectively as “Clear Skies,” which together would
have required a 70% reduction in sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide
emissions by 2018, although actual attainment probably would have been
delayed until 2026 or later because of the legislation’s expansive “banking”
provisions.140 The ostensible goal of “Clear Skies” was to deal
comprehensively with air pollution from the electric power industry. In
2003, that industry was responsible for 72% of all sulfur dioxide emissions,
24% of nitrogen oxide emissions, and 41% of carbon dioxide emissions,
and more than 40% of all mercury emissions in the United States.141
Powerplant emissions of some pollutants—notably sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxides—had been trending downwards thanks mainly to the acid
rain program of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.142 However, utilities
had long complained about the “complexity” of the “multilayered and
interlocking patchwork of controls” applied to them.143
A more simplified and uniform approach to power-plant regulation had
been evolving for several years, pursuant to existing statutory mandates,
within the EPA.144 But the Bush Administration and Congress offered
several legislative proposals that would have regulated utility emissions of
major air pollutants in a more comprehensive and integrated way.
Competing with “Clear Skies” were two legislative proposals, one
sponsored by Senator James M. Jeffords (I-Vt.) and the other by Senator
Thomas R. Carper (D-Del.).145 Like the Bush Administration bill, those
proposals would have permitted banking and trading of allowances, but
unlike “Clear Skies,” they would have required greater overall emissions
reductions on shorter deadlines.146 In addition, the Jeffords and Carper
bills, but not “Clear Skies,” would have imposed regulatory controls to
reduce utility emissions of carbon dioxide to mitigate climate change.147

139.
This case study is adapted, in revised form, from Daniel H. Cole, ‘Best Practice’ Standards
for Regulatory Benefit–Cost Analysis, 23 RESOURCES L. & ECON. 1, 16–18 (2007).
140.
Remarks Announcing the Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiatives in Silver Spring,
Maryland, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 232 (Feb. 14, 2002).
141.
MCCARTHY & PARKER, supra note 74, at 2.
142.
Id.
143.
Id. at 5.
144.
See id. at 2–3.
145.
Id. at 9–11. See generally Clean Power Act of 2005, S. 150, 109th Cong. (2005) (detailing the
specifics of the Jeffords proposal); Clean Air Planning Act of 2003, S. 843, 108th Cong. (2003)
(detailing the specifics of the Carper proposal.
146.
MCCARTHY & PARKER, supra note 74, at 3–4; see also S. 150 §§ 704–06; S. 843, §§ 702–04.
147.
Id.
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On October 27, 2005, the EPA published a CBA, comprised of fortyfive separate documents,148 comparing the various legislative proposals to
control air pollution emissions from powerplants. Note that this CBA
differed from those discussed in the preceding case studies in one vital
respect: it is an agency CBA prepared in support of a legislative proposal,
rather than an agency CBA prepared in support of its own regulatory
proposal.149 As such, it is not subject to the same intensive OMB review
that accompanies CBAs agencies prepare in support of their own
regulations, although whether it should be remains an open question.150 The
lack of explicit standards and searching review of legislative CBAs means
that they are more prone to political manipulation.
In this case, the EPA’s economic analysis concluded that “Clear Skies”
was preferable to the Jeffords and Carper proposals because it produced
greater net social benefits than either of the alternatives.151 However,
because the CBA was based on dubious assumptions that were vital to its
outcome, including a highly controversial “senior death discount,” which
imposed a lower value on the lives of (statistical) elderly Americans, and
because those assumptions had to be explicitly specified in the CBA, other
analysts and the media could review and critique the CBA and its

148.
This fact is itself problematic from the point of view of those concerned with the
transparency, clarity, and replicability of CBAs.
149.
The EPA released a group of forty-five documents that were not collected into one document,
but are collectively known as the EPA’s CBA. Historical Multi-Pollutant Analyses, EPA.GOV,
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/epa-ipm/historicalmultip.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
150.
Executive Orders on regulatory review, such as EO 12866, supra note 43, expressly require
review of agency proposals of regulations; they do not speak to OMB review of agency CBAs prepared
in support of a president’s legislative proposals. Former OIRA chief John Graham provides several
rationales for why we might reasonably expect agency CBAs prepared in support of legislation to be
more lax than those prepared in support of the agency’s own regulations: (1) legislative CBAs, unlike
regulatory CBAs, are not informed by a notice and comment process; (2) the technical inputs to
legislative CBAs are not subject to the kind of independent, external peer-review that scientific advisory
boards provide in the case of agency CBAs for regulations; (3) legislative CBAs are not prepared with
an eye on potential judicial review, while agency CBAs for regulations are subject to arbitrary and
capricious review under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 USC §500 et seq.; (4) legislative CBAs
are inherently political in nature—they are inevitably skewed to favor the administrations preferred
policies; and (5) legislative deliberations, which focus on non-technical considerations such as values
and political ramifications, are fundamentally different from executive-branch agency deliberations,
which are informed by greater technical expertise. E-mail from John D. Graham, Dean, Indiana
University School of Public and Environmental Affairs, to author (Oct. 17, 2001) (on file with the
author).
Dean Graham’s reasons certainly help to explain why legislative CBAs are more likely to be (a) of
lower quality and (b) manipulated for political ends than regulatory CBAs (although it might be argued,
for example in opposition to his first reason that Congress can and does hold hearings to inform its
economic analyses), but they do not provide a sufficient normative argument against imposing a
consistent set of technical obligations and standards on executive branch agencies for all CBAs. For a
normative argument favoring consistent standards across legislative and regulatory CBAs, see infra note
166 and accompanying text.
151.
MCCARTHY & PARKER, supra note 74, at 9.
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findings.152 Less than a month after EPA published its CBA comparing
“Clear Skies” with the Jeffords and Carper proposals, the Congressional
Research Service (CRS)—a nonpartisan research and analysis agency of
Congress—published a report heavily criticizing the EPA’s assumptions
and analysis.153 What follows is a brief synopsis of the CRS report.154
The EPA’s CBA accurately concluded that “Clear Skies” would cost
less than the alternative legislative proposals.155 That conclusion was
unsurprising because “Clear Skies” was far less ambitious than the other
two proposals. It required fewer emissions reductions over a longer period
of time. But what matters is not gross costs or benefits, but the net. And,
according to the EPA’s own estimates, the “Clear Skies” bill would have
provided $6 billion in annual net benefits in 2010, compared to $51 billion
in annual net benefits for Senator Carper’s bill and $83 billion in annual net
benefits under Senator Jeffords’s bill.
The incremental benefits of the “Clear Skies” bill would have been
even lower but for dubious assumptions in the CBA about the regulatory
baseline. Specifically, the EPA assumed that in the absence of new
legislation neither the EPA nor the states would impose additional
regulatory controls on powerplant emissions. This assumption was
contradicted by three newly minted EPA rules regulating powerplant
emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury. The EPA’s final
CBA for “Clear Skies” failed to mention those new rules. Had they been
incorporated into the CBA, the incremental benefits of Clear Skies would
have been much lower, and the net benefits of Senator Jeffords’s bill would
have “far exceed[ed] those of Clear Skies” (as well as Senator Carper’s
bill).156
In addition to its unrealistic baseline assumptions, the EPA’s CBA for
“Clear Skies” made no attempt to monetize environmental benefits, which
significantly disadvantaged the Jeffords and Carper proposals because they
were designed and predicted to generate greater environmental benefits
than the Bush Administration’s “Clear Skies” initiative. Moreover, the
CBA did not model the health effects of regulating mercury emissions.
According to a different CRS Report to Congress, health benefits from the
EPA’s mercury regulations ranged from a few million dollars per year to
several billion dollars per year.157 Omitting these benefits, which are
relatively easy to estimate, from the “Clear Skies” CBA favored the Bush
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Id. at 14.
157.
JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32868, MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM
ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS: AN ANALYSIS OF EPA’S CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATIONS (2006).
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Administration’s proposal over the alternatives, either of which would have
more quickly imposed more stringent caps on mercury emissions.
Similarly, the EPA’s CBA for “Clear Skies” did not attempt to monetize
the benefits of reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. Indeed, the CRS
found that the “EPA’s benefit analysis is limited and incomplete, which
works to the disadvantage of alternatives to Clear Skies that include more
stringent standards.”158
The CRS Report also found that the EPA’s “Clear Skies” CBA
unreasonably assumed that the price elasticity for electricity and natural gas
would be zero and that powerplants were subject to short-term construction
constraints.159 Each of these dubious assumptions served to make the Bush
Administration’s “Clear Skies” initiative more attractive and the other
proposals, particularly Senator Jeffords’s bill, less attractive because they
would have entailed greater compliance costs for the utility industry.
The CRS Report did not, in so many words, accuse the Bush
Administration of manipulation and deception in preparing the CBA for
“Clear Skies,” but that was the implication, which subsequent media
reports made explicit. As a Washington Post reporter expressed it, “The
Bush administration skewed its analysis of pending legislation on air
pollution to favor its bill over two competing proposals.”160 The EPA
argued in response, but without any specifics, that the CRS analysis
“ignores and misinterprets our analysis.”161 Meanwhile, the government’s
economic watchdog, the OMB, which is charged with reviewing the quality
of agency CBAs, neither raised issues with nor returned the analysis to the
EPA for improvement.162 By way of contrast, consider the case of a CBA
for a regulation designed to protect endangered bull trout in Montana,
which the Bush Administration opposed. In that case, the OMB required
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (F&WS) to eliminate from its RIA fiftyfive pages detailing the expected benefits of the rule because the agency
used a methodology similar to that employed by the Bush Administration
to derive the benefits for its “Clear Skies” initiative.163
158.
MCCARTHY & PARKER, supra note 74, at 16.
159.
See id. at 13.
160.
Juliet Eilperin, Report Accuses EPA of Slanting Analysis: Hill Researchers Say Agency Fixed
Pollution Study to Favor Bush’s ‘Clear Skies’, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2005, at A08.
161.
Id.
162.
To the contrary, former OIRA chief John Graham has asserted that, “The OIRA assisted the
EPA in preparing the benefit–cost analysis for Clear Skies.” John D. Graham, The Evolving Regulatory
Role of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 171, 182 (2007).
This does not mean the OIRA was complicit in the EPA’s manipulation of the CBA for “Clear Skies,”
however. The bulk of the CBA for “Clear Skies” was completed years before the Jeffords and Carper
bills were offered in the Senate, and there is no evidence that the OIRA assisted the EPA in preparing
portions of the CBA comparing the three legislative proposals.
163.
See Blaine Harden, Trout-Protection Data Questioned: Costs but No Benefits Published,
WASH. POST, April 17, 2004, at A03.
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The chief difference between the EPA’s CBA for “Clear Skies” and its
CBA for protecting the endangered fish species is that the former was an
agency CBA prepared in support of White House legislation, while the
latter was a CBA prepared in support of its own regulation. As noted
earlier, the OIRA is not under any general obligation to review CBAs
prepared in support of legislative, as opposed to regulatory, proposals.164
Still, the differential treatment of similar accounting methods across two
different agency CBAs underscores persistent questions about whether
OMB review in the Bush Administration was designed to maximize
regulatory efficiency or to minimize regulatory burdens on industry.165
This case study of the “Clear Skies” CBA suggests three important
lessons. First, CBAs can be, and have been, strategically manipulated
toward certain preferred outcomes.166 In the case of “Clear Skies,” the EPA
164.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
165.
Despite John Graham’s laudable introduction of “prompt” letters, which the OMB issues to
promote regulatory as well as deregulatory initiatives, when he headed the OIRA in the George W.
Bush Administration, evidence exists to support the widespread belief among environmentalists that the
Bush OMB possessed an anti-regulatory bias. A Government Accounting Office study of hundreds of
cases of regulatory review between 2001 and 2002 found that the vast majority of proposed regulations
changed following OMB review were weakened; virtually none were strengthened. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-929 RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’
DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS (2003); see also David Driesen, Is Cost–
Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 364–66 (2006). The GAO’s findings are not
necessarily evidence of bias at OMB. After all, if overregulation were endemic and underregulation
exceedingly rare, as many conservative politicians and regulated industries would have us believe, the
GAO’s findings would be expected. However, as Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore recently
concluded, “there is no persuasive reason to believe that agencies pervasively tend to overregulate,
rather than underregulate.” REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 27, at 165. Thus, the GAO’s findings are
more difficult to explain absent OMB bias. What’s more, prior to the Clinton Administration
deregulatory decisions were not subject to OMB review, regardless of their often significant social
costs. Although the George W. Bush Administration did not rescind the Clinton Administration rule
requiring OMB review of deregulatory proposals, it displayed a “relative indifference” toward such
proposals. Id. at 154. But see John Graham, Paul R. Noe, & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing the
Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953 (2006)
(defending the George W. Bush OMB’s record on regulatory review).
166.
Importantly, CBAs are as prone to manipulation by (nominally) independent scholars and
interest groups as by government agencies. Consider the case of standards for arsenic in drinking water
established by the Clinton Administration and subsequently reconsidered by the George W. Bush
Administration. See supra note 72. After the Clinton Administration lowered the ceiling from 50 parts
per billion (ppb) to 10 ppb, legitimate concerns were raised about the quality of the agency’s CBA.
Those allegations did not rise to the level of fraud or even manipulation; the agency’s assumptions
(including of linear, as opposed to sub-linear, dose-response rates) were all defensible, if contestable.
The EPA’s CBA was in fact contested in a critique published by the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies. JASON K. BURNETT & ROBERT W. HAHN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTEBROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, EPA’S ARSENIC RULE: THE BENEFITS OF THE
STANDARD DO NOT JUSTIFY THE COSTS (2001). In that study, Burnett and Hahn redid the EPA’s cost–
benefit analysis using different assumptions including sub-linear dose-response and lower values of
human lives based on the presumption that arsenic’s long latency period tends to cause cancer in older,
rather than younger, people. They concluded that the EPA’s new standard for arsenic would, if
implemented, cost lives on net. Id. at 2. However, Burnett and Hahn’s assumptions were, if anything,
more dubious and less justifiable than the EPA’s, and their analysis was subjected to withering critiques
by other scholars. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 137, at 2356–65 (arguing, among other things, that

COLE 55 – 89 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

Law, Politics, and Cost–Benefit Analysis

10/19/2012 11:26 AM

87

deliberately structured its CBA to support the Bush Administration’s
preferred legislation against alternative proposals that would have
increased costs for industry, but provided greater net social benefits.
Second, and more reassuring, the manipulated CBA failed—“Clear Skies”
was not enacted—at least in part because the manipulation was uncovered
and exposed.167 It was uncovered because CBA methodology requires the
explicit specification of assumptions and valuations. Thus, this case
exemplifies Justice Brandeis’s famous aphorism, “[s]unlight is . . . the best
of disinfectants.”168
Ultimately, however, the demise of “Clear Skies” cannot be accounted
a victory for regulatory rationality because Congress did not enact either
the Jeffords bill or the Carper bill. Instead, Congress did nothing, which
was the worst outcome from a social welfare perspective. The Bush
Administration was for its bill or no bill at all; if it could not get collective
action on its terms, it did not want collective action. Congress, meanwhile,
is under no constitutional obligation to enact economically efficient
legislation or avoid enacting economically inefficient legislation. In the
final analysis, CBA merely provides (usually useful, though sometimes
skewed or biased) information for decision making. It does not, and cannot,
take the politics out of politics.
The third and final lesson from the “Clear Skies” case study concerns
the differential treatment of agency CBAs prepared in support of legislative
proposals as opposed to agency regulations. Whatever the rationale(s) for

Burnett and Hahn’s analysis was ideologically motivated, not properly based on the available science as
determined by the National Academy of Sciences, and so did not really constitute a “peer review” of the
EPA’s CBA in any legitimate sense of that phrase). It is difficult to read the Burnett and Hahn CBA as
an even-handed effort to fairly and realistically assess costs and benefits. Their analysis favored nothing
less than a return to the pre-existing 50 ppb standard for arsenic in drinking water, which not even the
Bush Administration supported (as noted above, the Bush EPA merely sought to raise the standard from
the Clinton EPA’s 10 ppb to 20 ppb). Nevertheless, conservative groups found Burnett and Hahn’s
analysis useful in their ultimately unsuccessful political campaign against the Clinton standard. See
Special Report: The Arsenic Controversy, REGULATION, Fall 2001, at 42.
167.
John Graham suggests that the demise of “Clear Skies” in the Senate had more to do with the
election cycle and President Bush’s “limited leadership” on climate change. JOHN D. GRAHAM, BUSH
ON THE HOME FRONT: DOMESTIC POLICY TRIUMPHS AND SETBACKS 200–01 (2010).
168.
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLES’ MONEY 92 (1913). Arguably, even more transparency,
not in the CBA itself, but in agency processes relating to the preparation and publication of CBAs,
would make the tool even more useful, and less subject to abuse, in policymaking. Aidan Vining and
David Weimer have proposed a rule (for the Canadian government) according to which any federal
government agency, provincial government, or local government seeking federal financial support for
infrastructure “must file for the public record . . . a cost–benefit analysis . . . with the Treasury Board
and the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons.” The CBA would be posted on an
Internet site to which any interested person could post comments. Aidan R. Vining & David L. Weimer,
Criteria for Infrastructure Investment: Normative, Positive, and Prudential Perspectives 28–29 (April 8,
2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). The purpose is to make the process of
preparing CBAs more transparent, so as to “discourage the wildest claims of benefits” (and costs). Id. at
30.
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such differential treatment,169 the failure to impose and enforce design
standards on agency CBAs in support of legislative proposals creates
opportunities for political manipulation that potentially discredit CBA in
general. If a certain approach to benefit accounting is inappropriate for
regulatory CBAs, then it should be equally inappropriate for legislative
CBAs. The lack of methodological consistency across regulatory and
legislative domains inevitably casts a shadow over CBA generally as a
policy-informing tool.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Read together, the three case studies from the preceding section
illustrate three basic characteristics of the politics of CBA: (1) it is a useful
tool for both protecting against welfare-reducing regulations and protecting
welfare-enhancing regulations from political attack and rollback; (2)
inherently subjective elements of CBAs make them liable to manipulation
and abuse to make regulatory proposals appear welfare-maximizing when
they are not, and vice versa; but (3) the transparency of formal CBA allows
for exposure and correction of manipulations and flaws. Taken together,
these points tell an overall, but not entirely, positive story about the role of
CBA in politics and in the substantive resolution of social dilemmas.
The three case studies also suggest two less obvious implications for
CBA’s role in the resolution of collective-action problems. First, CBAs
have substantial utility for decision making on social-cost problems even
when the law does not permit their use. As the first case study suggests,
even if the EPA were no longer required by statute and executive order of
the President to prepare CBAs, agency staff might well choose to prepare
them anyway in order to (a) inform themselves of economic sources of
potential political backlash and (b) defuse political opposition in cases
where the CBA is positive. Second, because the Constitution does not
compel Congress to enact only welfare-enhancing legislation, CBA
necessarily remains subordinate to other political goals and motivations.
This was the case, for example, with the “Clear Skies” program, where the
Bush Administration was not intent on maximizing a social-welfare
function but in implementing its own preferred policy—or no policy at all.
The virtuous transparency of CBA allowed the Congressional Research
Service to expose the flaws in the EPA’s CBA for “Clear Skies,” showing
that other, more stringent legislative proposals would generate greater net
social benefits. The CRS critique helped to kill “Clear Skies,” but it could
not ensure the enactment of the other, more socially efficient proposals.

169.

See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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We must be careful, however, not to draw too many or too firm
conclusions about political uses and abuses of CBA from these three case
studies because they are merely a convenience sample and are not
necessarily representative of the wide range of circumstances in which
CBAs are prepared and used in the federal government (not to mention
state and local governments). For one thing, all three of the case studies
involve the EPA, which is just one of many federal, executive branch
agencies, albeit one with an unusually high level of experience and
expertise in preparing CBAs. Second, two of the three case studies concern
proposed changes to National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs)
under the Clean Air Act, which is an unusual circumstance precisely
because, as a matter of law, the standards must be set regardless of cost.
Third, and finally, none of the three case studies directly concerns the
social discount rate, which, as noted in Part II, is a major factor in political,
economic, and philosophical disputes over CBA. In each of the three case
studies, the outcome of the CBA was fairly insensitive to the choice of a
discount rate. However, in many other cases, especially those with effects
extending into the distant future, that is, intergenerational effects, the social
discount rate almost invariably becomes a focal point of contention and
disagreement.170
Finally, those who write about social-cost problems and
legislation/regulatory solutions should not neglect the significant political
role CBAs, among other decision-making tools, play in policy arenas. This
Article has merely described how CBAs do so. More research is needed to
determine the extent to which CBAs actually influence outcomes and to
delineate more precisely strategic behavior in the design and application of
CBAs.

170.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

